ואף על גב דתרתי לאו דוקא, תרתי מיהא דוקא.
And although two of these distinctions are not precise, the other two are in any event precise distinctions, based upon which a distinction can be drawn.
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ואף על גב דתרתי לאו דוקא, תרתי מיהא דוקא.
And although two of these distinctions are not precise, the other two are in any event precise distinctions, based upon which a distinction can be drawn.
מאי שנא שינוי בעלים דלא הוי פסולו בגופו – מחשבה בעלמא; שינוי קודש נמי מחשבה בעלמא הוא! אלא כיון דאחשבה – פסלה; הכא נמי, כיון דאחשבה – פסלה.
The Talmud explains why two of the distinctions are not precise: What is different about deviation with regard to the owner, such that its disqualification does not concern the offering itself? It is that this merely constitutes a change of thought. Deviation from the type of offering is also merely a change of thought; the offering is not physically affected. Rather, this distinction between deviation with regard to the owner and deviation from the type of offering is false; one should claim that if deviation from the type of offering disqualifies it once the one who slaughtered it had that intent, here too, once the one who slaughtered it had intent to deviate from its owner, he disqualified it.
ולרב פנחס בריה דרב מרי, דאמר יש שינוי בעלים לאחר מיתה – תרתי מיהא איכא למיפרך!
The Talmud explains the difficulty with the second distinction, the case where the owner died: And according to Rav Pineḥas, son of Rav Mari, who says that disqualification by deviation with regard to the owner applies even after the owner’s death, there is no distinction in this regard between deviation from the type of offering and deviation with regard to the owner. In any event, there are two remaining distinctions based on which the comparison between a deviation from the type of offering and a deviation with regard to the owner can be refuted.
אלא אמר רב אשי, אמר קרא: ״ונרצה לו לכפר עליו״ – ולא על חבירו.
Rather, Rav Ashi says that the halakha that it is prohibited to sprinkle the blood for the sake of one other than the owner is derived from a verse. The verse states: “And it should be accepted for him to atone for him” (Leviticus 1:4), teaching that the sacrificial rite that atones for the owner, namely, the sprinkling of the blood, must be performed specifically for him, and not for another.
Text data via Sefaria: William Davidson Edition - English and William Davidson Edition - Vocalized Aramaic, CC-BY-NC; edition provenance: Koren. Display terminology has been modernized for readability.