§ The Talmud asks: From where do we derive that we require that an offering’s slaughter be performed for its own sake? It is derived from a verse, as the verse states: “And if his offering is a sacrifice [zevaḥ] of peace offerings” (Leviticus 3:1), teaching that slaughter [zeviḥa] must be performed for the sake of a peace offering.
ודילמא היינו שמייהו!
The Talmud challenges: But perhaps when the verse states: “A sacrifice of peace offerings,” “a sacrifice of peace offerings” is simply the name of this type of offering, and is not referring to intent of the one slaughtering it.
מדכתיב ״המקריב את דם השלמים״, ״הזורק את דם השלמים״ – ולא כתיב ״זבח״; והכא כתיב ״זבח״; שמע מינה: שתהא זביחה לשם שלמים.
The Talmud answers: From the fact that it is written in other verses: “Who offers the blood of the peace offering” (Leviticus 7:33), and: “Who sprinkles the blood of the peace offering” (Leviticus 7:14), and the term: A sacrifice [zevaḥ], is not written, whereas here, in this verse, the term: “A sacrifice [zevaḥ] of peace offerings,” is written, learn from it that the slaughter [zeviḥa] must be performed for the sake of a peace offering.
אשכחן זביחה, שאר עבודות מנלן?
The Talmud asks: We found a source for the halakha that slaughter must be performed for the sake of the offering being sacrificed. From where do we derive that the other sacrificial rites, i.e., collecting the blood, conveying it to the altar, and sprinkling it on the altar, must also be performed for the sake of the offering?
וכי תימא לילף מזביחה; מה לזביחה – שכן נפסלה שלא לשם אוכלין בפסח!
And if you would say: Let us derive from the fact that slaughter must be performed for the sake of the offering that the other sacrificial rites must be performed for the sake of the offering as well, this derivation can be refuted, as slaughter has a unique element of stringency: What is unique about slaughter? It is unique in that with regard to a Paschal offering, the offering is disqualified if it is slaughtered not for the sake of those who eat it. If the Paschal offering is slaughtered for the sake of people who are incapable of eating it, such as one who is too ill to eat, it is disqualified. By contrast, performing other rites with this intent does not disqualify the offering. Therefore, one cannot assume that a halakha that applies to slaughter applies to other rites as well.