אלא לאו, רישא בעבודה זרה וסיפא בשאר מצות. ושגג בלא מתכוין בשאר מצות היכי דמי? דסבור דשומן הוא, ואכלו. מה שאין כן בשבת דפטור, דנתכוון לחתוך את התלוש וחתך את המחובר פטור. ואביי שגג בלא מתכוין היכי דמי? דסבור רוק הוא, ובלעו. מה שאין כן בשבת, דפטור, דנתכוון להגביה את התלוש וחתך את המחובר פטור. אבל נתכוון לחתוך את התלוש וחתך את המחובר — חייב.
Rather, is it not that the first clause of the baraita is dealing with the contrast between Shabbat and idolatry, and the latter clause of the baraita is dealing with contrasting Shabbat and other mitzvot? And what are the circumstances of: Unwitting without intent, with regard to other mitzvot? It is in a case where one thought that it was permitted fat, and ate it, and later discovered that it was forbidden fat. This is one example of other mitzvot where one is liable. That is not the case with regard to Shabbat, where he is exempt, as one who intended to cut a detached plant and unwittingly severed a plant still attached to the ground is exempt. And according to Abaye, who holds that he is liable in that case, what are the circumstances of: Unwitting without intent, with regard to other mitzvot? It is in a case where one had something in his mouth and he thought it was spittle and swallowed it with no intention to eat it, and it turned out to be forbidden fat that he swallowed. This is one example of other mitzvot, where he is liable. That is not the case with regard to Shabbat, where the phrase: He is exempt, is referring to the case of one who intended to lift a plant detached from the ground and mistakenly severed a plant still attached to the ground. In that case, even Abaye agrees that he is exempt. However, one who intended to cut a detached plant and unwittingly severed a plant still attached to the ground is liable since he intended to perform a standard act of cutting. Therefore, no proof can be cited from this baraita.