Sanhedrin 77A

נזקין, שעשה בהן שוגג כמזיד ואונס כרצון ⁠– אינו דין שחייב בהן את המצמצם?

with regard to damage, where the Torah rendered the legal status of one who causes damage unwittingly like that of one who causes damage intentionally, and the status of one who causes damage due to circumstances beyond his control like that of one who causes damage with intent, as one is always responsible for damage that he caused (see Bava Kamma 26a), is it not logical that the Torah rendered one who confines an animal in a place where it cannot survive liable to pay restitution even though he did not perform an action?

רב אחא בר רב פוטר. אמר רב משרשיא: מאי טעמא דאבוה דאבא דפוטר? אמר קרא: ״מות יומת המכה רצח הוא״. ברוצח הוא דחייב לן מצמצם, בנזקין לא חייב לן מצמצם.

The Talmud explains the conflicting opinion. Rav Aḥa bar Rav exempts the one who confined the animal in the sun from recompensing the owner. Rav Mesharshiyya said: What is the reason for the opinion of Rav Aḥa, the father of my father, who exempts him from payment? The reason is that the verse states: “Or in enmity he struck him with his hand and he died, the assailant should be put to death; he is a murderer” (Numbers 35:21). The phrase “he is a murderer” restricts the liability of one who confines another. It is in the case of a murderer that the Torah renders for us one who confines another liable to be executed. But in the case of damage the Torah does not render for us one who confines the animal of another liable to recompense the owner, as it was not his action that caused the damage.

אמר רבא: כפתו ומת ברעב ⁠– פטור. ואמר רבא: כפתו בחמה ומת, בצינה ומת ⁠– חייב. סוף חמה לבא, סוף צינה לבא ⁠– פטור.

§ Rava says: If one bound another and he died of starvation, he is exempt from the liability to receive a court-imposed death penalty, as it was not his action that caused the death of the victim. Even if the victim was hungry when he was bound, the starvation that caused his death ensued at a later stage. The one who bound him is liable to be punished by the heavenly court. And Rava says: If one bound another in the sun and he died of the heat, or in a cold place and he died of exposure, he is liable to be executed, as from the moment that he bound him, the victim began dying. But if one bound another in a place that at the time was not exposed to the sun or the cold, even though ultimately the sun would arrive at that place, or ultimately the cold would reach that place, he is exempt from execution, as when he bound the victim, the future cause of death was not present.