Bava Kamma 74A

מדסיפא במיפך והזמה, רישא נמי במיפך והזמה.

From the fact that the latter clause of the baraita states a ruling with regard to a case in which the second set of witnesses both reverses the order of events and renders the first pair as conspiring witnesses, it may be inferred that the first case as well, in parallel fashion, states a ruling with regard to a case in which the second set of witnesses both reverses the order of events and renders the first pair as conspiring witnesses.

דקתני סיפא: ״מעידנו את איש פלוני שהפיל את שן עבדו, וסימא את עינו״⁠ – שהרי העבד אומר כן; ונמצאו זוממין ⁠– משלמין דמי עין לרב.

This is as it teaches in the latter clause of the baraita, that if witnesses say: We testify with regard to so-and-so that he knocked out his Canaanite slave’s tooth and afterward blinded his eye, which requires the master to emancipate him and compensate him for the value of his eye, as that is what the slave says, i.e., this testimony is advantageous to the slave, and subsequently they were found to be conspiring witnesses, they pay the value of an eye to the master.

היכי דמי? אי דלא קא מודו להו בתראי בחבלא כלל, דמי כוליה עבד לרב בעי שלומי ליה!

Abaye analyzes this clause of the baraita: What are the circumstances of this case? If it is speaking of a situation where the latter set of witnesses, who attested that the first set of witnesses were conspiring witnesses, do not concede that there was any injury at all inflicted on the slave by his master, then there is no testimony to confirm that those injuries were inflicted other than that given by the witnesses who were shown to be conspiring witnesses. Consequently, they should be required to pay the entire value of the slave to the master, as this is the amount of monetary damage the master stood to incur as a result of their false testimony.