Bava Kamma 73B

לאו כדיבור דמי, ורבי יוסי סבר: תוך כדי דיבור כדיבור דמי.

are not like one testimony of continuous speech, but are considered separate testimonies, and therefore the testimony concerning the theft remains valid. And R' Yosei maintains that the legal status of a pause within the time required for speaking a short phrase is like that of continuous speech, and therefore the testimony about the theft is disqualified together with the testimony concerning the slaughter.

וסבר רבי יוסי: תוך כדי דיבור כדיבור דמי? והתנן: ״הרי זו תמורת עולה, תמורת שלמים״⁠ – הרי זו תמורת עולה, דברי רבי מאיר.

The Talmud asks: But does R' Yosei really maintain that the legal status of a statement interrupted or retracted within the time required for speaking a short phrase is like that of continuous speech? But didn’t we learn otherwise in a Mishnah (Temura 25b): If one designates an animal by saying: This animal is hereby a substitute for a burnt-offering, a substitute for a peace-offering, he has issued two contradictory statements and therefore this animal is considered a substitute for a burnt-offering, i.e., only the first part of his statement is accepted. This is the statement of R' Meir.

רבי יוסי אומר: אם לכך נתכוון מתחילה, הואיל ואי אפשר לקרות שני שמות כאחד ⁠– דבריו קיימין. ואם אמר: ״תמורת עולה״, ונמלך ואמר: ״תמורת שלמים״⁠ – הרי זו תמורת עולה.

R' Yosei says: If he intended this outcome from the outset, that the animal should serve both as the substitute of a burnt-offering and as the substitute of a peace-offering, since it is impossible for one to call it by two names at once, i.e., the only way he can make his intent known is by issuing these two apparently contradictory declarations consecutively, his statement stands, and the animal has the status of both a substitute for a burnt-offering and a substitute for a peace-offering. But if he said: This animal is a substitute for a burnt-offering and then changed his mind and said: A substitute for a peace-offering, it is a substitute for a burnt-offering.