Zevachim 50A

מדתנא דבי רבי ישמעאל.

is apparent from that which the school of R' Yishmael taught, discussed in the previous chapter (41a).

דבר הלמד בהיקש, מהו שילמד בבנין אב? אמר רבי ירמיה: לא לכתוב צפונה באשם, ותיתי מבנין אב מחטאת; למאי הלכתא כתביה? לאו למימרא דדבר הלמד בהיקש אין חוזר ומלמד בבנין אב?

The Talmud asks: What is the halakha as to whether a matter derived via a juxtaposition can teach its halakha in another context via a paradigm? R' Yirmeya says: It must be that it cannot, as, if it could, let the Torah not write the requirement to slaughter an offering in the north of the Temple courtyard with regard to a guilt offering (see Leviticus 14:13), and one can derive it via a paradigm from the halakha of a sin offering, since they are both offerings of the most sacred order. For what halakha did the verse write it with regard to a guilt offering as well? Is this not to say that a matter derived via a juxtaposition cannot then teach its halakha in another context via a paradigm?

וליטעמיך, תיתי מבנין אב מעולה! מאי טעמא לא אתי ⁠– משום דאיכא למיפרך: מה לעולה שכן כליל; חטאת נמי איכא למיפרך: מה לחטאת שכן מכפרת על חייבי כריתות.

The Talmud questions this proof: But according to your reasoning, why not derive the halakha that a guilt offering must be slaughtered in the north from the halakha of a burnt offering, via a paradigm? What is the reason that this halakha is not derived from there? It must be because it can be refuted with the following claim: What is notable about a burnt offering? It is notable in that the Torah teaches that it is entirely burned on the altar, which is not so with regard to a guilt offering. The Talmud now states its objection: In that case, the derivation from a sin offering via a paradigm can also be refuted: What is notable about a sin offering? It is notable in that it atones for those sins liable for punishment by karet, which is not so with regard to a guilt offering. If so, there is no proof from here.