to exclude from the liability for karet one whose violation was unwitting, or who was compelled to act, or who was mistaken. The term “that man” teaches that only one who offered up with intent is liable to receive karet. The Talmud challenges: If so, here too, with regard to slaughtering outside, the term is necessary to exclude one whose violation was unwitting, or who was compelled to act, or who was mistaken. How can the term be used to teach that only one who acts alone is liable?
תרי ״ההוא״ כתיבי.
The Talmud explains: With regard to slaughtering outside, two instances of the term “that man” are written: “Blood should be imputed to that man, he has shed blood, and that man should be cut off from among his people” (Leviticus 17:4). One instance teaches that only one who acts with intent is liable to receive karet, and the other teaches that only one who acts alone is liable.
ואלא ״לה׳״ למה לי? להוציא שעיר המשתלח.
The Talmud has now justified its claim that the liability of one who slaughters an offering outside for the sake of an ordinary purpose is derived from the phrase “ish ish.” Accordingly, the Talmud asks: But why do I need the term “to YHWH”? The Talmud explains: It is written to exclude from liability one who slaughters the Yom Kippur scapegoat outside the courtyard.
חומר בהעלאה כו׳.
§ The Mishnah teaches: The greater stringency with regard to offering up outside is that two people who grasped a knife and together slaughtered an offering outside the courtyard are exempt. But if two grasped a limb from an offering and together offered it up outside, they are liable.