Zevachim 107B

תיתי מבינייא.

Given that each suggestion has a different refutation, the Talmud suggests: Derive it through a comparison to the common element shared by these two cases. Slaughtering and sprinkling are each just one of the sacrificial rites that are performed with an offering, and yet one is liable for performing them outside the Temple. Since the derivation is based on a comparison to both cases, the refutations offered for each individual case are no longer relevant.

אם כן, לא יאמר בזריקה, ותיתי מבינייא!

The Talmud rejects this: If that were so, and one can derive liability for one rite through a comparison to the common element shared by two other rites, then let the Torah not state that one is liable for sprinkling blood outside the Temple, and instead derive it from the common element shared by slaughtering and offering up outside the Temple.

ותיתי משחיטה ⁠– מה לשחיטה, שכן נפסלת שלא לשם אוכלין בפסח; תיתי מהעלאה ⁠– מה להעלאה, שכן ישנה במנחה; ותיתי מבינייא;

The derivation would be as follows: And if you suggest deriving liability for sprinkling from the liability for slaughtering, that could be refuted. What is notable about slaughtering? It is notable in that, with regard to a Paschal offering, if one slaughters it with the intent that it be for the sake of those who cannot eat, it is thereby disqualified. Sprinkling does not share this stringency. And if you suggest deriving liability for sprinkling from the liability for offering up, that could also be refuted. What is notable about offering up? It is notable in that liability for offering up also exists with regard to a meal offering. Sprinkling does not share this stringency. But it should still be possible to derive liability for sprinkling from the common element shared by the two cases. Since the derivation is based on a comparison to both cases, the refutations offered above for each individual case are no longer relevant.