Shabbat 62B

ומאי רבי מאיר? דתניא: לא תצא אשה במפתח שבידה, ואם יצאת ⁠— חייבת חטאת, דברי רבי מאיר. רבי אליעזר פוטר בכובלת ובצלוחית של פלייטון.

And to what statement of R' Meir is the Talmud referring? As it was taught in a baraita: A woman may not go out on Shabbat with a key that is in her hand, and if she went out she is liable to bring a sin-offering; this is the statement of R' Meir. R' Eliezer exempts a woman who goes out with a bundle of fragrant herbs and with a flask of balsam oil [palyaton].

כובלת ⁠— מאן דכר שמה?

The Talmud finds the statement of R' Eliezer difficult: A bundle of fragrant herbs; who mentioned anything about that? R' Meir did not mention a bundle of herbs; why did R' Eliezer mention it in his response?

חסורי מחסרא והכי קתני: וכן בכובלת וכן בצלוחית של פלייטון לא תצא, ואם יצאה ⁠— חייבת חטאת, דברי רבי מאיר. רבי אליעזר פוטר בכובלת ובצלוחית של פלייטון. במה דברים אמורים ⁠— כשיש בהם בושם, אבל אין בהם בושם ⁠— חייבת.

The Talmud answers that the baraita is incomplete and it teaches the following: And likewise, with a bundle of fragrant herbs, and likewise with a flask of balsam oil she may not go out, and if she went out she is liable to bring a sin-offering; this is the statement of R' Meir. R' Eliezer exempts in the cases of a bundle of fragrant herbs and a flask of balsam oil. In what case is this statement said? In a case where the vessels have perfume in them; however, in a case where they do not have perfume in them, she is liable for carrying the flask out into the public domain on Shabbat.

אמר רב אדא בר אהבה: זאת אומרת המוציא אוכלין פחות מכשיעור בכלי ⁠— חייב. דהא אין בה בושם כפחות מכשיעור בכלי דמי, וקתני חייבת.

Rav Adda bar Ahava said: That is to say that one who carries out a measure of food that is less than the measure that determines liability on Shabbat, but he does so in a vessel, he is liable. Although he is not liable for carrying the food out into the public domain, he is liable for carrying out the vessel. In that case, the vessel is not subordinate to the food, and therefore it is significant. Since the case of the flask in which there is no perfume is comparable to the case in which there is less than the required measurement of food in a vessel, and it was taught in the case of the flask that she is liable even though the fragrance of the perfume remains in the vessel, it stands to reason that one who carries a vessel containing less than a measure of food is also liable.