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Text Excerpt
בהאי קרא קמיפלגי: ״ונרצה לו לכפר עליו״ — עליו ולא על חבירו. רבה סבר: חבירו דומיא דידיה. מה הוא דבר כפרה — אף חבירו דבר כפרה, לאפוקי האי ערל דלאו בר כפרה הוא.
disagree with regard to this verse, which is stated with regard to a different offering: “And it should be accepted for him to make atonement for him” (Leviticus 1:4). It is inferred: For him and not for his fellow. One cannot achieve atonement through an offering that has been designated for someone else. Rabba and Rav Ḥisda disagree with regard to the halakhic conclusions that should be drawn from this law. Rabba holds that the law applies to another who is similar to him: Just as he is eligible for atonement through the sprinkling of the blood of this offering, so the law applies to another who is eligible for atonement. This comes to exclude this uncircumcised person, who is not eligible for atonement. Since an uncircumcised person is not fit for the Paschal lamb, slaughtering it for him does not disqualify the offering.
ורב חסדא סבר: האי ערל נמי, כיון דבר חיובא הוא — בר כפרה הוא, [הואיל] דאי בעי מתקן נפשיה.
And Rav Ḥisda holds that with regard to this uncircumcised person as well, since he is obligated to bring the Paschal lamb, he is considered eligible for atonement through the Paschal lamb. Why is an uncircumcised person seen as obligated to bring the Paschal lamb? Since if he wants, he can make himself fit through circumcision, and the obligation will automatically apply to him. There is a way for him to include himself among those who eat the offering; therefore, he cannot categorically be considered someone who is not eligible for atonement. Consequently, slaughtering the Paschal lamb for him disqualifies the offering.
ומי אית ליה לרב חסדא ״הואיל״? והא איתמר: האופה מיום טוב לחול, רב חסדא אמר: לוקה. רבה אמר: אינו לוקה.
The Talmud challenges this explanation: But does Rav Ḥisda accept this argument of since? Does he maintain that one can discuss a situation that does not exist due to the possibility that the present circumstances might change? But it was said that Rabba and Rav Ḥisda disagree about this as it pertains to the case of one who bakes on a Festival for use during the week: Rav Ḥisda said he is flogged for having violated the Festival by baking in order to eat the food on a weekday; Rabba said he is not flogged.