Nazir 22B

מר זוטרא בריה דרב מרי אמר: האי, היינו דרמי בר חמא. דבעי רמי בר חמא: ״הרי עלי כבשר זבח שלמים״, מהו?

Mar Zutra, son of Rav Mari, said: This problem, with regard to one who associated himself with the vow of a woman whose naziriteship was later nullified, is in essence the same as the dilemma of Rami bar Ḥama concerning a different issue. As Rami bar Ḥama raises a dilemma: If someone said about a certain object: This is forbidden to me like the flesh of a peace-offering, what is the halakha? Is this a vow or not?

כי מתפיס איניש, בעיקרא מתפיס, או דלמא בצננא מתפיס?

The Talmud explains the two sides of the dilemma: When a person associates himself with a prohibition by means of another object, does he associate himself with it by its fundamental state? In this case, this would mean that he has associated himself with an article from which it is prohibited to benefit, as the flesh of a peace-offering is forbidden before its blood is sprinkled. Consequently, the vow would take effect. Or perhaps one associates himself with the item by its eventual permitted state [bitzenana], and as the flesh of a peace-offering may be eaten after the sprinkling of its blood, the vow is ineffective. This question is apparently analogous to the issue of the second woman’s vow: Is she referring to the fundamental, initial state of the first vow, before its nullification, or to its later, permitted state, after it has been dissolved?

מי דמי? התם כיון דאמר ״הרי עלי כבשר זבח שלמים״, אף על גב דלאחר שנזרק דמו מצי אכיל ליה בחוץ, מיקדש קדיש. אבל הכא, אי סלקא דעתך בצננא קא מתפיס ⁠— הא הפר לה בעלה! איכא דאמרי, היינו דרמי בר חמא ודאי.

The Talmud refutes this argument: Are the two cases comparable? There, since he said: It is forbidden to me like the flesh of a peace-offering, even though after its blood has been sprinkled it can be eaten outside the courtyard, nevertheless it is sacred to a certain extent, which means that his vow is referring to a forbidden object. However, here, if it should enter your mind that the second woman associates herself with the object’s permitted state, her husband has nullified her vow, and therefore there is no vow at all, which renders the statement of the second woman meaningless. Some say that this last refutation is not accepted. In their opinion, the dilemma concerning two women who vowed is certainly similar to that of Rami bar Ḥama.