Ketubot 58B

אלא לרב שמואל בר יהודה, קמייתא משום סימפון ובתרייתא משום סימפון, מאי בינייהו?

However, according to Rav Shmuel bar Yehuda, the first ruling was due to abrogation and the latter ruling was also due to abrogation. If so, what is the difference between the reasoning of the initial version of the Mishnah and the decision of the court that convened after them?

איכא בינייהו בדיקת חוץ. מר סבר: בדיקת חוץ ⁠— שמה בדיקה. ומר סבר: בדיקת חוץ ⁠— לא שמה בדיקה.

The Talmud answers: The practical difference between them is with regard to superficial investigation, i.e., the investigation that could have been conducted on his behalf by his female relatives, which could have been only a superficial investigation. One Sage holds that superficial investigation is considered a valid investigation, and therefore once he requested to marry her and the marriage date arrived, there is no concern of a later abrogation, and one Sage holds that superficial investigation is not considered a valid investigation, and consequently there is still concern that when he consummates the marriage he will find some blemish on her and abrogate the marriage.

מתני׳ המקדיש מעשה ידי אשתו ⁠— הרי זו עושה ואוכלת. המותר, רבי מאיר אומר: הקדש, רבי יוחנן הסנדלר אומר: חולין.

Mishnah: If one consecrates his wife’s earnings, meaning anything she produces, such as thread that she spins from wool, which, according to the rabbis’ ordinance, belongs to her husband, she may work and sustain herself from her earnings, as the consecration is ineffective. However, there is a dispute with regard to the surplus, meaning any earnings she produces in excess of the amount she is required to produce for her husband. R' Meir says: The surplus is consecrated property, and R' Yoḥanan the Cobbler says: The surplus is also non-sacred.

גמ׳ אמר רב הונא אמר רב: יכולה אשה לומר לבעלה ״איני ניזונת ואיני עושה״. קסבר: כי תקינו רבנן מזוני ⁠— עיקר, ומעשה ידיה משום איבה. וכי אמרה ״איני ניזונת ואיני עושה״⁠ — הרשות בידה.

Talmud: Rav Huna said that Rav said: A woman may say to her husband: I will not be sustained by you and, in turn, I will not work, i.e., you will not keep my earnings. He holds that when the rabbis instituted the various obligations and rights of a husband and wife, the husband’s obligation to provide for the wife’s sustenance was the primary one, and they then decreed that her earnings belong to him in return, due to concern about animosity. If he would be obligated to provide for her sustenance but she would be allowed to work and keep her earnings, he would resent her. Since her right to sustenance is the primary one, if she says: I will not be sustained by you and, in turn, I will not work, i.e., you will not keep my earnings, she has permission to do so. As the arrangement was established for her benefit, she may cancel it if it is not suitable for her.