Ketubot 42B

מאי לאו בשעמד בדין! לא, בשלא עמד בדין.

What, is it not referring to a case where he has stood trial, and yet R' Shimon does not render him liable for the oath as the payment was originally a fine? Rabba refutes this argument: No, that baraita is referring to a situation where he has not stood trial.

והא מדרישא בשעמד בדין, סיפא נמי בשעמד בדין. דקתני רישא: אין לי אלא דברים שמשלמין עליהם את הקרן. תשלומי כפל, תשלומי ארבעה וחמשה, והאונס והמפתה ומוציא שם רע, מנין ⁠— תלמוד לומר: ״ומעלה מעל״, ריבה.

Abaye persists: But from the fact that the first clause of the baraita deals with one who has stood trial, it follows that the latter clause also deals with one who has stood trial. As the baraita teaches in its first clause: I have derived the halakha only for matters for which one pays the principal. With regard to the payments that are double the principal, and payments that are 9 times the principal, and those of the rapist, and the seducer, and the defamer, from where is it derived that all these are included in the liability to bring an offering for falsely taking an oath on a deposit? The verse states: “If anyone sin and commit a trespass [ma’ala ma’al]” (Leviticus 5:21). The doubled usage of the word trespass serves to amplify and include any false oath taken in denial of monetary liability.

היכי דמי? אי דלא עמד בדין, כפילא מי איכא? אלא פשיטא בשעמד בדין. ומדרישא בשעמד בדין, סיפא נמי בשעמד בדין!

Abaye analyzes this statement: What are the circumstances? If this is referring to a situation when he has not stood trial, is there double payment in that case? Everyone agrees that one who admits his guilt is exempt from the double payment, and yet this obligation is mentioned in the baraita. Rather, it is obvious that the baraita is referring to a case where it is claimed that he has already stood trial and was declared liable to pay the double payment, and the accused individual denies this claim. Abaye summarizes his question: And from the fact that the first clause of this baraita deals with one who has stood trial, the latter clause also deals with one who has stood trial, and even so R' Shimon does not deem him liable to bring an offering for his oath.