Study Ketubot folio 35A with parallel Hebrew-English text, traditional commentary, and modern study tools. Free access to Babylonian Talmud online.
Text Excerpt
מאי לאו, אסון ממש! לא, דין אסון. איכא דאמרי, איתיביה רבי יוחנן לריש לקיש: ״ולא יהיה אסון ענוש יענש״, מאי לאו, דין אסון? לא, אסון ממש.
Is this not referring to actual harm, i.e., the woman’s death? And the verse states that he pays only if she did not die, but if she died is he exempt, even if he was not forewarned? The Talmud answers: No, the verse can be explained to mean: If there is no sentence of harm. If the court does not actually sentence him to death, he pays the damages for the miscarried fetus. He is exempt from payment only if he is actually executed. Some say a different version of this exchange: R' Yoḥanan raised an objection to the opinion of Reish Lakish: “And yet no harm follow, he should be punished” (Exodus 21:22); is this not referring to a sentence of harm? The Talmud answers: No, the verse can be explained to mean: If there is no actual harm.
Rava said: Is there anyone who said that those who unwittingly performed a transgression for which one is liable to receive the death penalty are obligated to pay? But didn’t the Sage of the school of Ḥizkiyya teach: The verse speaks of one who smites a person, and the verse speaks of one who smites an animal. The two cases are juxtaposed in the verse “And one who smites an animal should pay for it, and one who smites a person should die” (Leviticus 24:21).
מה מכה בהמה לא חילקת בו בין בשוגג בין במזיד, בין מתכוין לשאין מתכוין, בין דרך ירידה לדרך עלייה לפוטרו ממון, אלא לחייבו ממון — אף מכה אדם לא תחלוק בו בין בשוגג בין במזיד, בין מתכוין לשאין מתכוין, בין דרך ירידה לדרך עלייה — לחייבו ממון, אלא לפוטרו ממון.
Just as in the case of one who smites an animal, you did not distinguish between one who did so unwittingly and one who did so intentionally, between one who acted with intent and one who acted with no intent, between one who smites in the course of a downward motion and one who smites in the course of an upward motion, and in all those cases it is not to exempt him from paying money but rather to obligate him to pay money; so too, in the case of one who smites a person, do not distinguish between one who did so unwittingly and one who did so intentionally, between one who acted with intent and one who acted with no intent, between one who smites in the course of a downward motion and one who smites in the course of an upward motion. In all those cases as well it is not to obligate him to pay money but rather to exempt him from paying money. The halakha in both cases is unconditional; when he smites an animal he is always liable to pay and when he smites a person he is always exempt from payment, regardless of whether or not he is actually executed.