Gittin 75A

מכלל דבעלמא, נתינה בעל כרחיה לא הויא נתינה.

This proves by inference that generally, giving against the recipient’s will is not considered valid giving, as if it were, then Hillel would not have needed to institute this ordinance.

מתקיף לה רב פפא, ואיתימא רב שימי בר אשי: ודלמא כי אצטריך ליה לתקוני ⁠– שלא בפניו, אבל בפניו ⁠– בין מדעתו בין בעל כרחו הויא נתינה!

Rav Pappa objects to this, and some say it was Rav Shimi bar Ashi who raises this objection: And perhaps when it was necessary for Hillel to institute an ordinance allowing the seller to repay the money against the will of the purchaser it was specifically in a case where he gives the money not in the presence of the purchaser. But when he repays him in his presence, whether the recipient was willing or whether it was against his will, it is considered valid giving. Accordingly, one cannot apply Hillel’s ordinance to the case of conditional bills of divorce.

ואיכא דאמרי, אמר רבא: מתקנתו של הלל ⁠– ״הרי זה גיטך על מנת שתתני לי מאתים זוז״, ונתנה לו ⁠– בין מדעתו ובין בעל כרחו הויא נתינה; וכי איצטריך ליה להלל לתקוני ⁠– שלא בפניו, אבל בפניו ⁠– בין מדעתו בין בעל כרחו הויא נתינה.

And there are those who say a different version of this discussion. Rava says: From the ordinance of Hillel it can be inferred that if one says to his wife: This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you will give me 200 dinars, and she gave it to him, whether it was with his consent or whether it was against his will, it is valid giving. And the case where it was necessary for Hillel to institute his ordinance was when the giving of the money was not in his presence. But if the repayment was in his presence, whether it was with his consent or whether it was against his will, it is considered valid giving.