Beitzah 27A

גמר בשולייהו ⁠— חזו להו.

And then when their cooking is finished, they once again become fit for eating. This demonstrates that even food that had temporarily been set aside because it had become inedible does not remain prohibited for the entire day.

אמר ליה אביי: ולטעמיך, תקשי לך קדרות דעלמא, דהא סתם קדרות דעלמא בין השמשות רותחות הן, ולאורתא אכלינן מינייהו!

Abaye said to him: And according to your reasoning that foods are temporarily considered muktze while being cooked, cooked dishes in general present a difficulty for you on Shabbat as well. As ordinary cooked dishes in general are still bubbling at twilight and not yet edible, and yet we partake of them later in the evening. This demonstrates that although the food was considered muktze at the critical moment of twilight, it is not prohibited for the duration of Shabbat.

אלא גמרו בידי אדם לא קא מבעיא לן. כי קא מבעיא לן גמרו בידי שמים.

Rather, it must be that we have no dilemma with regard to a food whose completion, which brings it to its finished and edible form, is entirely in the hands of a person, e.g., beans and lentils. Such foods are certainly not considered as muktze for all of Shabbat simply because they had become temporarily unfit for eating. Where we have a dilemma is with regard to an item whose completion is in the hands of Heaven, such as figs and grapes, which dry by the heat of the sun. This dilemma remains unresolved.

רבי יהודה נשיאה הוה ליה ההוא בוכרא. שדריה לקמיה דרבי אמי, סבר דלא למחזייה. אמר ליה רבי זריקא ואיתימא רבי ירמיה: רבי יהודה ורבי שמעון ⁠— הלכה כרבי יהודה. הדר שדריה לקמיה דרבי יצחק נפחא, סבר דלא למחזייה. אמר ליה רבי ירמיה ואיתימא רבי זריקא: רבי יהודה ורבי שמעון ⁠— הלכה כרבי יהודה.

§ The Talmud returns to the issue of permitting firstborn animals. R' Yehuda Nesia had a firstborn animal that acquired a blemish on a Festival, and he wished to serve it to priests staying at his house. He sent it to be presented before R' Ami for examination, and R' Ami thought that he should not examine it, in accordance with the opinion of R' Shimon. R' Zerika said to him, and some say it was R' Yirmeya: The principle is that in cases of dispute between R' Yehuda and R' Shimon, the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of R' Yehuda, who in this case permits examination of the firstborn. R' Yehuda Nesia then sent the firstborn to be presented before R' Yitzḥak Nappaḥa, who likewise thought that he should not examine it. R' Yirmeya said to him, and some say it was R' Zerika: The principle is that in cases where R' Yehuda and R' Shimon disagree, the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of R' Yehuda.