Bava Metzia 95A

עד שיפרוט לך הכתוב ״יחדו״.

unless the verse specifies that one is liable only where he curses both together, which it does not do in this case.

אפילו תימא רבי יאשיה, לחלק הכא לא צריך. מאי טעמא ⁠– סברא הוא: מה לי קטלה כולה, מה לי קטלה פלגא.

The Talmud answers: You can even say that R' Natan’s derivation from the word “or” is in accordance with the opinion of R' Yoshiya, as here, in the verse concerning a borrower’s liability, there is no need for the word “or” to divide the cases. What is the reason? The fact that injury and death are alone sufficient to engender liability is based on logical reasoning, as follows: What difference does it make to me if it is entirely killed, and what difference does it make to me if it is partially killed, i.e., injured? Either way, the animal is not in the state in which it was borrowed, so the borrower is liable to compensate the owner.

גניבה ואבידה בשואל מנא לן?

§ The Talmud asks: From where do we derive the liability of a borrower in a case of theft or loss?

וכי תימא: נילף משבורה ומתה, מה לשבורה ומתה ⁠– דלא אפשר למיטרח ואתויי, תאמר בגניבה ואבידה דאפשר למיטרח ואתויי!

And if you would say: Let us derive it from the fact that a borrower is liable if the animal entrusted to him was injured or died, because theft and loss are similar to injury and death in that they are cases of accidents, this derivation can be refuted. What is notable about a case where the animal was injured or died? It is notable in that it is no longer possible to make an effort and bring the animal back to its undamaged state, and so it is reasonable that the borrower is liable for such occurrences. should you also say this ruling about a case of theft or loss, where it is still possible to make an effort to locate and bring back the animal? Since the animal is still extant, perhaps the borrower should not be liable.