Bava Kamma 90A

הקדש, חמץ ושחרור ⁠– מפקיעים מידי שיעבוד.

Consecration of an item to the Temple, the advent of the prohibition of leavened bread taking effect upon a leavened food, and the emancipation of a slave abrogate any lien that exists upon them. Therefore, the emancipation of a slave resulting from the knocking out of his tooth or the blinding of his eye abrogates the lien that the husband has on the slave as usufruct property, leaving the woman as the solitary owner.

לימא דרבא תנאי היא? לא; דכולי עלמא אית להו דרבא, והכא אלמוה רבנן לשיעבודא דבעל.

The Talmud questions this explanation: should we say that this statement of Rava is a dispute between tanna’im? According to this explanation, the baraita that states that the slave is not emancipated when he is struck by the woman holds that the lien of the husband is not abrogated, which would run counter to the statement of Rava. The Talmud responds: No; it is the case that everyone agrees with the statement of Rava that a lien is abrogated, and here the reason why the baraita holds that the husband’s lien on the slave is not abrogated is that the rabbis strengthened the lien of a husband on his wife’s property, and it is only this type of lien that is not abrogated by emancipation.

ואיבעית אימא: דכולי עלמא ⁠– לית להו להני תנאי תקנת אושא, והכא ⁠– בקנין פירות כקנין הגוף דמי קמיפלגי –

And if you wish, say instead that everyone agrees that these tanna’im of the two baraitot hold that there is no ordinance of Usha, and here, they disagree with regard to the question whether ownership of the rights to use an item and to its produce is like ownership of the item itself. In this case, the husband enjoys the usage of the slave while the wife owns the slave himself. The baraita that rules that the slave is not emancipated when struck by the woman holds that the husband is also considered to be an owner, and the baraita that rules that the slave is emancipated when struck by the woman holds that the husband is not considered to be an owner.