Bava Kamma 44A

שור באדם ⁠– שעשה בו קטנים כגדולים, אינו דין שחייב על הקטנים כגדולים?

then in the case of an ox killing a person, where the Torah renders small oxen like large ones with regard to this act, as a young calf that kills a person is killed just as an adult ox that kills a person, is it not logical that the Torah renders it liable for killing minors, i.e., a boy or a girl, just as for killing adults? Why is it necessary for the verse to teach this halakha?

לא, אם אמרת אדם באדם ⁠– שכן חייב בארבעה דברים, תאמר בשור ⁠– שאינו חייב בארבעה דברים? תלמוד לומר: ״או בן יגח או בת יגח״⁠ – לחייב על הקטנים כגדולים.

The Talmud rejects this claim: No, this cannot be derived by logic alone. If you say that a person who kills a person is liable even when the victim is a minor, this may be due to the extra severity in the case of a human assailant, as he is liable to pay 4 types of indemnity for causing injury; pain, humiliation, medical costs, and loss of livelihood, in addition to payment for the actual damage. should you also say that this is the halakha with regard to an ox, whose owner is not liable to pay these 4 types of indemnity? Clearly, this halakha cannot be derived merely through logical comparison between the two cases. Therefore, the verse states: “Whether it has gored a son or has gored a daughter,” to render it liable for minors as well as adults.

ואין לי אלא במועדין, בתם מנין?

And I have derived this halakha only with regard to forewarned oxen; from where do I derive that in the case of an innocuous ox, it is killed if it kills a boy or a girl?