Bava Kamma 22B

רישא ⁠– בעל גמל חייב, דלא איבעי ליה לאפושי בטעינה. סיפא ⁠– חנווני חייב, דלא איבעי ליה לאנוחי נרו מאבראי.

Consequently, in the first clause, the owner of the camel is liable, as he should not have overloaded the camel with flax to such a degree that it extended out so far from the sides that it could catch fire and ignite the store. But in the latter clause, the storekeeper is liable, as he should not have placed the lamp outside.

תא שמע: המדליק את הגדיש, והיה גדי כפות לו, ועבד סמוך לו ונשרף עמו ⁠– חייב. עבד כפות לו, וגדי סמוך לו ונשרף עמו ⁠– פטור.

The Talmud attempts again to resolve the dispute: Come and hear a Mishnah (61b): With regard to one who ignites a stack of grain, and there was a goat tied to the stack, and there was also a Canaanite slave adjacent to it who was not tied to it, and both the goat and the slave were burned together with the stack of grain and killed, the one who ignited the fire is liable to pay compensation for both the stack and the goat, but he is exempt from paying for the slave because the slave should have run from the fire. Conversely, if the slave was tied to the stack and there was a goat adjacent to it that was not tied to it, and the slave and the goat were burned together with the stack of grain, the one who ignited the fire is completely exempt from payment for damage because he is liable to receive capital punishment for murder, and he is punished only for the greater transgression.

בשלמא למאן דאמר אשו משום חציו ⁠– משום הכי פטור. אלא למאן דאמר אשו משום ממונו, אמאי פטור? אילו קטל תוריה עבדא, הכי נמי דלא מיחייב?!

The Talmud clarifies: Granted, according to the one who says that one’s liability for the damage caused by his fire is due to its similarity to his arrows, due to that reasoning he is exempt for the damage to the stack of grain in the second case, because it is as if he killed the slave with his arrows and consequently became subject to receive court-imposed capital punishment, and one who is subject to the death penalty is not liable to pay monetary compensation for the same act, as he receives the greater punishment of the two. But according to the one who says that liability for damage caused by his fire is due to its similarity to his property, why is he exempt? If his ox, which is his possession, were to kill a slave, would he also not be liable to pay for the damage?