Study Bava Batra folio 48A with parallel Hebrew-English text, traditional commentary, and modern study tools. Free access to Babylonian Talmud online.
Text Excerpt
״יקריב אתו״ – מלמד שכופין אותו. יכול בעל כרחו? תלמוד לומר: ״לרצונו״. הא כיצד? כופין אותו עד שיאמר: ״רוצה אני״.
With regard to one who pledges to bring a burnt-offering, the verse states: “If his offering be a burnt-offering of the herd, he should offer it a male without blemish; he should bring it to the door of the Tent of Meeting, according to his will, before YHWH” (Leviticus 1:3). The seemingly superfluous phrase “he should offer it” teaches that they can coerce him to bring the offering. One might have thought that it can be offered entirely against his will, by taking it from his possession and sacrificing it. Therefore, the verse states: “According to his will” (Leviticus 1:3). How can these texts be reconciled? They coerce him with various punishments until he says: I want to bring the offering. This seems to prove that consent resulting from coercion is considered to be valid consent. Perhaps this principle can apply to acquisition, as a source for Rav Huna’s ruling.
ודלמא שאני התם, דניחא ליה דתיהוי ליה כפרה! ואלא מסיפא: וכן אתה אומר בגיטי נשים – כופין אותו עד שיאמר: ״רוצה אני״.
The Talmud rejects this proof: But perhaps there it is different, since he is in fact amenable to achieving atonement, despite his earlier statement to the contrary. But rather, prove Rav Huna’s ruling from the latter clause of a Mishnah (Arakhin 21a): And similarly you find this halakha with bills of divorce, that when the court rules that he must divorce his wife, they coerce him until he says: I want to divorce my wife.
ודלמא שאני התם, דמצוה לשמוע דברי חכמים! אלא סברא הוא – אגב אונסיה גמר ומקנה.
The Talmud rejects this proof as well: But perhaps there it is different, because it is a mitzva to listen to the statement of the rabbis. The assumption is that when he is required by the court to divorce his wife, his real desire is to perform the mitzva of listening to the rabbis, and therefore he actually wants to divorce her. This does not apply to the case of a transaction performed under duress. Rather, Rav Huna’s ruling does not have a source in a Mishnah or baraita, but is based on logical reasoning: By means of his being coerced, the seller then willingly decides to sell the field and transfers it.